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Abstract
Firm diversification across unrelated businesses is prevalent in many emerging
economies, in contrast to the practices in developed economies. A fundamental
diﬀerence between these two types of economies concerns with the existence of
sound economic institutions including in particular the institutions constraining
government expropriation of private properties. In this paper, using a survey data
set of private enterprises in China, we find that severer government expropriation
in the form of higher informal levies, extralegal payments, and entertainment fees
causes firms to diversify. We then provide two case studies to highlight the extra
costs that China’s private entrepreneurs need to bear for doing businesses, and
how they can subsequently leverage their relations with government bureaucrats to
diversify into various businesses.
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1 Introduction
Diversified firms are found to be prevalent in emerging economies such as China, India,
Mexico, and Russia. And studies have shown that firm diversification leads to better
performance in those emerging economies (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000a; Khanna and
Yafeh, 2005).1 This is in contrast to the trend in developed economies where there exist
diversification discounts in corporate valuation and as a result firms adopt focused strate-
gies for their businesses.2 What accounts for the contrasting patterns in firm diversifi-
cation between emerging economies and developed economies? A fundamental diﬀerence
between these two types of economies is that there exist sound economic institutions (par-
ticularly, the institutions constraining government expropriation of private properties) in
developed economies but not in developing ones.
Emerging economies are characterized with pervasive and severe government ex-
propriation of private properties. It has been suggested that private entrepreneurs in
those economies may diversify their businesses in response to government expropriation
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Albeit a reasonable con-
jecture, there is little rigorous empirical work on the relationship between government
expropriation and firm diversification. Part of the empirical challenge lies in data limita-
tion, particularly in cross-country studies for which comparable measures of government
expropriation are diﬃcult to come by. In addition, empirical investigation has to address
various endogeneity issues. In this paper, we fill in the void by using data from the largest
emerging economy, China, and carefully addressing the identification problems.
The data used in this study come from a survey of China’s private enterprises con-
ducted in 2000. Unlike their state-owned counterparts, who are the favorite kids of the
socialist government of China, private enterprises are the so-called adopted kids facing
systematic discriminations and substantial constraints in business entries and subsequent
operations. In particular, to meet various government regulations of business entry and
ongoing operations, private enterprises are subject to heavy expropriations from the gov-
ernment, which maintains a significant role in the economy vis-à-vis the market in reg-
ulating business entry decisions and in adjudicating commercial disputes (Du, Lu, and
Tao, 2014). Thus, the business strategy of private firms can reflect most clearly the
impact of government expropriation on firm diversification. Moreover, China provides a
good setting to study the eﬀects of government quality on firm diversification strategy.
Despite the fact that China is a unitary state with unified laws and political system, there
exist substantial variations in the de facto protection of private property rights across its
regions (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2005; Du, Lu and Tao, 2008; World Bank, 2008), which allows
1See Keister (2000), Khanna and Palepu (1996), Camp (1989), and Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse
(1997) for the case of China, India, Mexico, and Russia, respectively. For a comprehensive review, see
for example Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), and Khanna and Yafeh (2007).
2For a recent survey, see Martin and Sayrak (2003).
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us to identify the impacts of government expropriation on firm diversification.3
To capture the extent of government expropriation, we combine three diﬀerent mea-
sures used by Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2002) and Cai, Fang and Xu (2011),
specifically, extra-legal payments (Tan Pai in Chinese), informal levies (Za Fei in Chi-
nese), and entertainment fees (Zhao Dai Fei in Chinese).
We find that firms reporting more severe government expropriation are more diver-
sified. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in government expropriation leads
to a 010-standard-deviation increase in firm diversification. These results remain robust
when the regression models are modified to address typical technical concerns in empirical
studies, including alternative estimation methods (Probit vs. linear probability model),
instrumental variable estimation, alternative measures of firm diversification and govern-
ment expropriation, controls for other types of institutions, and diﬀerent sub-samples.
To shed light on how in China government expropriation leads to diversification of
private enterprises, in case studies contained in Section 4, we highlight some extra costs
that China’s private entrepreneurs need to bear for doing businesses. First, China’s
private entrepreneurs generally need to go through complicated and characteristically
opaque business entry regulations to get their businesses started. Second, even after
setting up their businesses, those entrepreneurs would still be constantly disturbed with
ongoing levies on business operations imposed by governments, often in the name of
fulfilling corporate social responsibility.
Those two types of costs point to interesting interactions between China’s private
entrepreneurs and its government bureaucrats, who are in charge of both entry approvals
and ongoing business regulations. Private entrepreneurs have to spend much time to
first get acquainted with those bureaucrats, and then build up personal trust with them.
Private entrepreneurs need to make financial contributions to relieve the regional fiscal
burden and help build up bureaucrats’ signature projects. Furthermore, private entrepre-
neurs may need to nurture close relationships with those bureaucrats and/or their family
members through gifts and favors.
Only after private entrepreneurs establish relations and build trust with relevant bu-
reaucrats can they obtain licenses to do business in the regions and industries admin-
istered by those bureaucrats. However, those private entrepreneurs can then leverage
the relationship-specific capital that they build up with relevant bureaucrats in entering
new profitable industries upon their emergence and bidding for government procurement
contracts often in new business lines, both of which result in diversification into often
3Compared with cross-country studies, our cross-region study has two advantages: first, comparable
data (say, for government expropriation) are more readily available for sub-national units; and second,
it avoids the diﬃculty of controlling for diﬀerences in culture, political system, legal system, and religion
across countries in international studies so that we could minimize the impact of various confounding
factors.
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unrelated businesses.4 In Section 4, we argue that diversification across unrelated busi-
nesses within a region (industrial diversification) is often a more viable strategy for private
firms than expanding their existing business lines across regions (geographical diversifi-
cation). This Chinese-style corporate diversification is obviously due to the power of the
state vis-à-vis the market in the economy on one hand and the systematic discrimina-
tions against private enterprises on the other hand. In regions with severer government
discriminations against private enterprises and hence higher government expropriations,
government bureaucrats typically have more discretion over business regulations. Conse-
quently, the relationship-specific capital that private entrepreneurs build up with relevant
bureaucrats will be more valuable in winning for them favorable treatments from bureau-
crats, i.e., private entrepreneurs will obtain a higher degree of de facto protection of their
private property rights and will be more able to ride on the capital to conduct business
in multiple lines of business. Hence, we expect to observe a positive relationship between
government expropriation and firm diversification.
Our study is related to the long-standing resource-based view of corporate diversifica-
tion, namely, corporations might have advantageous physical resources (such as patents
and unique equipment) and intangible resources (such as brand), which allow corpo-
rations to diversify into new industries where the portfolio of these resources will be
applicable and confer competitive advantage.5 Clearly, the Chinese-style diversification
is built upon a special type of corporate resource, i.e., the relations and trust that private
entrepreneurs build up with relevant bureaucrats, which are obviously transferable across
industries leading to corporate diversification.
Nonetheless, while the Chinese-style diversification is an organizational response to
imperfect institutional environment, it most likely involves excessive diversification com-
pared with the benchmark scenario with good institutional environment for private busi-
nesses such as that in developed economies. Consequently, it does incur eﬃciency losses
with some social welfare implications. Firstly, the flip side of the excessive firm diversifi-
cation is a scaled-down operation size for each business line, which implies some eﬃciency
losses. Secondly, private entrepreneurs who enter into new lines of business due to their
relationship-specific capital with relevant bureaucrats may not be the most eﬃcient and
most qualified producers. In this sense, the Chinese-style diversification is expected to
have much worse eﬃciency consequences than does the resource-based diversification in
developed economies.
This paper is part of a growing literature focusing on how firms change their business
4Consistent with the findings in the literature on economic institutions, government expropriation
clearly dampens firm investment incentive. For example, high one-time setup costs deter firm entry,
while high levies reduce profit-maximizing scale and hence the equilibrium investment. However, what
we are concerned in this paper is the impact of government expropriation on firm diversification given
the size of investment.
5See, for example, Silverman (1999).
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strategies and practices in response to poor economic institutions. Examples include
the use of relational contracting instead of formal one in Vietnam where the courts are
incompetent (McMillan and Woodruﬀ, 1999), the use of informal trade credit in China
where private enterprises face discrimination in accessing formal financing (Brandt and
Li, 2003), and the shift toward underground business in face of over-regulation and high
taxes in Eastern Europe and Russia (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998).
Most related to this paper is the literature on the innovations in organizational strategies
in China in response to its imperfect and evolving institutional environment, such as
township-village enterprises or TVEs (Che and Qian, 1998; Jin and Qian, 1998; Li, 2003;
Li and Rozelle, 2003), and political participation of China’s private enterprises (Bai, Lu
and Tao, 2006; Li, Meng and Zhang, 2006).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Data and variables are introduced in Section
2, and the main empirical findings are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide
two case studies illustrating the Chinese-style diversification under state capitalism. The
paper concludes with Section 5.
2 Data and Variables
The dataset used in this paper is from the Survey of China’s Private Enterprises con-
ducted in 2000. 6 To achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in
China, the Survey usedmulti-stage stratified random sampling method. The total number
of private enterprises to be surveyed was first determined. After that, six cities/counties
were selected from each of the 31 regions (which refer to province-level administrative
units in China, and include 22 provinces, 4 municipalities directly under the supervision
of the central government, and 5 minority autonomous regions), which included the cap-
ital city of the region, one prefecture-level city, one county-level city, and three counties.
Next, the number of private enterprises to be surveyed in each region was determined by
the product of the percentage of the region’s share of private enterprises in the national
total and the total number of private enterprises in the survey. The same method was
used to determine the number of sample firms in every city/county and industry. Finally,
private enterprises were randomly chosen for each sub-sample. The dataset contains 3,073
initial observations. After deleting those observations with no industry code, we obtain
the final sample of 2,798 observations.
The use of data from private enterprises, instead of state-owned enterprises or publicly-
listed firms, oﬀers two additional advantages. First, unlike private firms that rely on
themselves to achieve firm survival and growth, China’s state-owned enterprises conduct
6The Survey was conducted jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China
Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
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business under the auspices of national and regional governments. Property rights pro-
tection is a much less concern to state-owned enterprises, and the de facto property rights
protection they enjoy exhibits much less variation across regions than that private firms
face. Second, the overwhelming majority of private firms in China are individually-owned
ventures, or partnerships, or individual- or family-controlled limited liability companies
(Asian Development Bank, 2003), where agency problem of corporate management is
not a prominent issue. Hence, compared with the studies using data of publicly-listed
firms, our focus on private enterprises allows us to isolate the impacts of property rights
protection on firm diversification from those of agency costs between management and
owners.
2.1 Measurement of Firm Diversification
The dependent variable in this study is about the extent of firm diversification. One ques-
tion in the Survey asks the entrepreneurs what are the primary industry and secondary
industries they are engaged in. The classification of industries in the Survey is as follows:
(1) agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishing; (2) mining; (3) manufacturing;
(4) electricity and gas; (5) construction; (6) geology and irrigation works; (7) transporta-
tion; (8) commerce and restaurant services; (9) finance and insurance; (10) real estate;
(11) social services; (12) public health and sports; (13) education and culture; (14) sci-
ence and technology; (15) others.7 Of all 2,798 observations, 1,864 firms have investment
in only one industry, 703 firms in two industries, 144 firms in three industries, and the
remaining 87 are engaged in four industries. A dummy variable Diversification is con-
structed, which takes value one if the firm has investment in more than one industries and
value zero otherwise. For robustness check, a categorical variable Number of Industries
is constructed, which takes value zero, one, two and three if a firm has investment in one,
two, three and four industries, respectively. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the
data. Referring to Table 1, we find that the mean values of Diversification and Number
of Industries are 0.334 (±0.472) and 0.447 (±0.733), respectively.8
Compared with some of the existing studies on vertical integration (e.g., Fan, Huang,
Morck, and Yeung, 2008; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Du, Lu, and Tao, 2012),
our measure incorporates both vertical and horizontal diversifications, and is likely to
capture the allocation of investment into unrelated industries given the broad classifica-
tion of industries adopted in the Survey. This allows us to examine more clearly whether
government expropriation aﬀects firm diversification that is not primarily driven by the
7There are 268 firms choosing ”others” as their primary line of business. Our main results remain
robust when these observations are excluded from the sample.
8A commonly-used measure of diversification is the Herfindahl Index, which is the sum of square of
sales share from each industry. Due to data limitation, however, we do not have the sales figures for each
industry, and have to resort to the use of number of industries as our measure of firm diversification.
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scope economy in production processes.
However, our measure may underestimate the extent of firm diversification and, conse-
quently, the impacts of government expropriation on firm diversification for two possible
reasons. First, the industry categories classified in the Survey are very broad (even
broader than the two-digit SIC codes in China). For example, a firm making both
toys and airplanes, two very diﬀerent products, is viewed as focusing on one industry
— manufacturing. To the extent that expropriation may lead to diversification within our
broadly-defined industries (e.g., making toys and airplanes within the general category
of manufacturing), our measurement of firm diversification would lead to an underesti-
mation of the expropriation eﬀect. Second, some private firms in China are organized
as group firms, with many independent units doing diﬀerent businesses. If the Survey
is done at the unit level, we would not observe the true extent of diversification of the
relevant group firm, which would again lead to an underestimation of the expropriation
eﬀect.
2.2 Measurement of Government Expropriation
According to North (1991), property rights protection concerns with the economic in-
stitutions constraining government expropriation. Specifically, in emerging economies,
government expropriation is usually consisted of one-time setup costs of doing business
and ongoing levies on business operations.9
China has had weak legal protection of private property rights. Private enterprises
were not even formally permitted to exist until 1988 with the enactment of the Private
Enterprise Administration Act, which was ten years after the initiation of China’s eco-
nomic reform. Only in 2004 did China make landmark amendments to its constitution to
protect private property rights. After 14 years of heated debate, preparation and draft-
ing, China passed in 2007 the Property Rights Law to make a further step forward to
the protection of private property rights. But at the same time law enforcement is rather
weak as judges are not well trained and their independence is dubious at best (Clarke,
1996).
In the meanwhile, local governments at diﬀerent levels have provided a minimum level
of property rights protection. Under fiscal decentralization, regional governments were
encouraged to promote the private enterprises under their jurisdiction that contribute
9While the expropriation of private properties in the form of extralegal payments, informal levies and
entertainment fees are often imposed by government oﬃcials in the name of undertaking some public
projects or financing some local events, they might well be disguises for bureaucrats to enhance their
private benefits (i.e., a form of corruption). For the survey data used in this study, the correlation between
extralegal payments/informal levies/entertainment fees and corruption (an index constructed based on
the reply to the survey question regarding the need for the government policies against corruption) is
indeed positive, albeit small in magnitude, implying that property rights protection and corruption are
not identical. Moreover, our regression results are robust to the inclusion of this index of corruption.
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to the local tax revenues and create employment opportunity. They made changes to
their policies to accommodate the rise of private business interests by providing de facto
property rights protection (Wu, 2003; Zhang, 2006). Furthermore, because of the lack of
formal and unified legal institutions for the protection of private properties, the de facto
property rights protection provided by regional bureaucrats varies substantially across
regions (Cull and Xu, 2005; Lu, Png, and Tao, 2013; World Bank, 2008). According to
the World Bank report on “Doing Business in China”, the number of days needed for
registering private properties ranges from 28 in Chongqing to 78 in Lanzhou, and the
percentage of registration costs in the value of the private properties varies from 3.1% in
Beijing to 12.6% in Guiyang (World Bank, 2008).
Nonetheless, the de facto property rights protection provided by the regional bureau-
crats comes at a great cost to the private enterprises. Regional bureaucrats often enlist
those private enterprises to undertake some public projects including bureaucrats’ sig-
nature projects, which help fill in the gap in fiscal balances and enhance bureaucrats’
private benefits. They also impose capricious and discretionary taxes and levies on those
private enterprises to directly contribute to the budgetary revenues and oﬀ-budgetary
accounts (Asian Development Bank, 2003).
In practice, there is an amazingly wide variety of extra-legal payments and infor-
mal levies imposed on private enterprises. According to a news report from Hong Kong
Economic Journal on June 10, 2011, in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, a manu-
facturing hub in South China, an export-oriented small or mid-sized private enterprise is
subject to numerous taxes, fees and charges, ranging from property tax, customs space
charges, and embankment protection costs to additional education tax and factory struc-
ture area management fee.10 Some of them may be standard taxes such as land and
property taxes, while the majority of them are obviously fees and charges imposed by
provincial and local governments in a discretionary manner. A striking characteristic of
these levies is that they are often imposed on private firms in the name of supporting
local public infrastructure projects and other public goods provision. Examples include
the embankment protection costs, the security costs, and the additional education tax.
These are window dressing tactics to link these surcharges with corporate social respon-
sibility to enhance the legitimacy of these levies. Many of these charges exist in the form
10The news report in the Hong Kong Economic Journal lists the following items of taxes and fees. (1)
Labor reallocation fees paid to the local Labor Bureau, which is 9 Yuan per worker; (2) Land tax, which
is rated at least 3.5 Yuan per square meter; (3) Property tax, approximately 5-10% of property value;
(4) Fees charged by the customs, which are five ten thousandths of export value; (5) Customs space
charges imposed by the provincial Commission of Foreign Economy and Trade, which is levied at a rate
of five ten thousandths of export value; (6) Embankment protection costs at a rate of five thousandths
of export value payable to provincial and local governments; (7) Additional education tax imposed by
provincial and local governments, which is 8% out of the value-added tax; (8) Security costs charged by
the local police bureau, which are 50 yuan per employee; (9) Land use overhead expenses at a rate of
0.5 yuan per square meter per month; and (10) factory structure area management fee, levied at 5 yuan
per square meter per month.
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of paying a certain proportion of firms’ business proceeds to local governments. Mean-
while, in maintaining their relations with government oﬃcials, private entrepreneurs need
to entertain them through eating, drinking and karaoke, and lavish them with gifts and
sports club membership. These expenses comprise a significant portion of a firm’s total
value added. For example, Cai, Fang, and Xu (2011) find that the entertainment costs
can be as high as 3 percent of a firm’s total value added.
To capture the severity of government expropriation, we follow Johnson, McMillan,
and Woodruﬀ (2002) and Cai, Fang and Xu (2011) in constructing three diﬀerent mea-
sures, specifically, extra-legal payments (Tan Pai in Chinese), informal levies (Za Fei in
Chinese), and entertainment fees (Zhao Dai Fei in Chinese).
In the Survey, there are questions asking private entrepreneurs to assess the severity
of extra-legal payments and informal levies in the region they are operating. The replies
(ranging from 1 to 3) are used to construct two variables, Extra-legal Payment and In-
formal Levy, with a higher value indicating a less severe problem.11 Meanwhile, there are
questions about entertainment fees and total net profits, and the replies to these ques-
tions are used to construct the ratio of entertainment fees to the profits, Entertainment
Fee. We then use the principal component method to combine them and re-scale the
generated, single index (denoted as Government Expropriation) so that a higher value
indicates severer government expropriation. However, as there is quite substantial miss-
ing information on entertainment fees (i.e., an attrition of more than 50% of the whole
sample), we use the first two variables (i.e., Extra-legal Payment and Informal Levy) for
the construction of Government Expropriation in the benchmark analyses, and include
the third variable (i.e., Entertainment Fee) as well in a robustness check.
Referring to Table 1, we observe that Government Expropriation (the principal com-
ponent of Extra-legal Payment and Informal Levy) has a mean value of 0.000 and a
standard deviation of 1.296. Clearly, there are significant variations across firms in the
severity of government expropriation. Many of the variations come from the cross-region
variations in the protection of private properties. Meanwhile, there are still some vari-
ations across firms within the same region, which could be due to the underlying firm
characteristics and entrepreneurial characteristics such as political connections (Li, Meng,
Wang, and Zhou, 2008).
2.3 Other Institutions
To isolate the eﬀect of government expropriation on firm diversification, we control for
other aspects of institutions, such as contracting institution, financial institution, taxation
11According to the “Report on China’s Private Enterprises Development” by China’s State Bureau for
Industry and Commerce in 2005, the extralegal payments to and informal levies by the government were
about 27.4% of the firms’ total legitimate tax payment, 75.8% of their after-tax net profits, and 145.9%
of their dividend income to shareholders.
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policy, and discrimination against private ownership.
Indeed, the prevailing studies of corporate diversification in emerging markets typi-
cally emphasize the importance of business groups in generating internal capital markets
to overcome the lack of access to external finance in a weak financial system, and in
internalizing transactions within the boundary of a firm to overcome inadequate external
contracting institutions, etc.12 No doubt the Chinese economy, like most emerging market
economies, also suﬀers from the deficiencies in these dimensions of institutional develop-
ment. Thus, by controlling for these various aspects of institutions, we can diﬀerentiate
the impacts of government expropriation from those of other institutions in promoting
corporate diversification. Specifically, in the Survey, there are questions asking private
entrepreneurs to assess the need in the region they are operating for improving contract-
ing institutions, for improving bank loan policy, for improving taxation policy, and for
ensuring equal treatment for enterprises of diﬀerent ownership structures. The replies to
these questions (either one if the answer is aﬃrmative or zero otherwise) are used for con-
structing, respectively, Contracting Institutions, Financial Institution, Taxation Policy,
and Equal Treatment.
2.4 Other Control Variables
To deal with the omitted variables bias, we control for entrepreneurial characteristics,
firm characteristics, region characteristics, and industry dummies. Variables related to
entrepreneurial characteristics include: his/her human capital, i.e., Age (the age of an
entrepreneur), Education (the number of years of schooling),Managerial Experience (the
number of years of having a managerial position before the entrepreneur started his/her
own business), and SOE Cadre (a dummy variable indicating whether an entrepreneur
used to be a manager in a state-owned enterprise); his/her political capital, i.e., Govern-
ment Cadre (a dummy variable indicating whether an entrepreneur used to be a govern-
ment oﬃcial), CPC Membership (a dummy variable indicating whether an entrepreneur is
a member of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC)), and CPPCC Membership (a dummy
variable indicating whether an entrepreneur is a member of the Chinese People’s Polit-
ical Consultative Conference (CPPCC));13 and his/her social capital, i.e., Donation (a
dummy variable indicating whether an entrepreneur has made any donation) and Social
Status (perceived by the entrepreneur).14 If a firm makes donations, the firm may have
better social image and the entrepreneur is regarded as fulfilling her/his social respon-
12See, for example, Khanna and Palepu (2000b).
13CPC is the legislature and is regarded as the highest organ of state power in China while CP-
PCC is the political advisory organ to the Chinese People’s Congress (legislature) and the government
(administration).
14Here Social Status is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10 based on the entrepreneur’s reply
to the survey question regarding his/her social status, with a higher value representing a lower social
status.
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sibility. The self-perception of social status may reflect the social capital resources the
entrepreneur has access to.
Firm characteristics include Firm Age (logarithm of years since establishment)15 and
Firm Size (logarithm of employment). To capture the general region characteristics, we
use the Logarithm of GDP per capita as it is a comprehensive indicator of the level of
economic development in diﬀerent regions.
Human capital endowment may aﬀect the ability of entrepreneurs to enter new in-
dustries in response to new developments of diﬀerent industries. Political capital may
facilitate entrepreneurs’ entry into new industries by going through entry regulations
smoothly. Social capital may help entrepreneurs to acquire information about new busi-
ness lines and smoothly conduct business operations after diversification into new busi-
nesses. We include Firm Age and Firm Size to incorporate the consideration that a firm
would naturally diversify its investment across industries when it grows over time.
Descriptive statistics of all key variables are given in Table 1.
3 Impacts of Government Expropriation on Firm Di-
versification
3.1 Comparison of Diversified Firms and Focused Firms
We first examine the diﬀerences in government expropriation, entrepreneur and firm
characteristics between the group of diversified firms (Diversification=1) and the group
of focused firms (Diversification=0). Table 2 presents the sample mean and median values
of some key variables for the two groups and the t-statistics of sample mean comparison
tests and the z-statistics of the Wilcoxon tests assessing whether the two samples of firm
observations come from the same distribution.
The mean and median values of government expropriation for the focused firm group
are −0090 and −0457 respectively, which are statistically significantly much lower than
those for the diversified firm group (0173 and 0550 respectively). This suggests a strong
positive association between government expropriation and firm diversification.
Next, we turn to entrepreneur characteristics. Looking at entrepreneurs’ human cap-
ital, we find that entrepreneurs of the diversified firm group have higher education quali-
fications, are younger in age, have more managerial experience, and were more frequently
SOE cadres than the entrepreneurs of the focused firm group. In terms of political capital,
entrepreneurs of the diversified firm group had been more frequently government cadres
before they became business people and are more likely to be CPC and CPPCCmembers,
15A firm could be first established as a private enterprise. It could also be established as other types
of enterprises, but subsequently transformed into a private enterprise. In one of the robustness checks,
we focus on the subsample of firms first established as private enterprises.
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which point to a higher level of political endowment for entrepreneurs of diversified firms.
Similarly, entrepreneurs of the diversified firm group typically have more social capital;
they are more likely to make donations and perceive themselves as enjoying higher so-
cial status when compared with the entrepreneurs of focused firms. All the diﬀerences
between the two groups in entrepreneurial characteristics are statistically significant.
Then we look at the key firm characteristics variables. Diversified firms are typically
larger in size and longer in history than do focused firms, which are consistent with
our prediction that larger and older firms have a stronger tendency to diversify their
businesses.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, compared with the entrepreneurs of the fo-
cused firms group, entrepreneurs of the diversified firms group perceive a higher level of
needs to improve contracting institutions, loan policy, and taxation policy, and provide
equal treatment for firms with diﬀerent ownership structures. Hence, it is important to
control for these institutions to isolate the eﬀect of government expropriation on firm
diversification.
3.2 Benchmark Regression Results
To systematically investigate the impacts of government expropriation on firm diversifi-
cation, we estimate the following equation:
 = +  · +X0γ +  (1)
where  , ,  represent firm, industry, and region, respectively;  mea-
sures the extent of diversification;  is the measure of the severity of government
expropriation; X is a vector of entrepreneur and firm characteristics, and industry and
region dummies; and  is a random error term.
In general the standard errors for micro-level data need to be adjusted for possible
clustering to deal with the heteroskedasticity problem. However, in practice, when the
number of clusters is small (i.e., less than 42), the clustered standard errors could be
misleading (e.g., Wooldridge, 2003, 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As the number of
clusters in our study is 31, we use instead the White-robust standard errors.
To estimate specification (1), we use the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) method, instead
of the nonlinear estimation methods such as Probit. This is because though nonlinear
estimation is more eﬃcient, it requires assumptions on functional forms and error dis-
tributions. Moreover, nonlinear estimation becomes considerably more complicated with
instrumental variable estimation.16 Nonetheless, for ease of comparison, we also report
the Probit regression results.
16For more discussion on the diﬀerences between OLS and nonlinear estimation, please see Angrist
and Pischke (2009).
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The OLS estimation result of specification (1) is presented in Column 1 of Panel A,
Table 3. It is found that government expropriation has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant impact on firm diversification. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in
government expropriation leads to a 0.10-standard-deviation increase in firm diversifica-
tion. Panel B of Table 3 reports the corresponding result of Probit regression, which is
very similar to that of OLS estimation.
In Columns 2-7, we stepwisely include control variables related to entrepreneurial
characteristics (i.e., human capital, political capital, and social capital), firm characteris-
tics (i.e., firm age, and firm size), other institutions (i.e., contracting institutions, financial
institutions, taxation policy, and equal treatment), regional dummies, and industry dum-
mies. Clearly, compared with Column 1 of Table 3, the results regarding the impacts of
government expropriation on firm diversification remain robust to these controls.
Note that our results are robust to the control of firm size, indicating that for a
given size of investment there are still significant impacts of government expropriation
on firm diversification.17 In other words, our study shows that government expropriation
induces firm diversification even though government expropriation may adversely aﬀect
investment incentive. Meanwhile, our results are robust to the inclusion of various other
institutions, which allows us to isolate the impacts of government expropriation and
diﬀerentiate our study from those focusing on the impacts of contracting institutions on
vertical integration (Fan, Huang, Morck, and Yeung, 20087; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Mitton, 2009; Du, Lu, and Tao, 2012).
3.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Despite a long list of control variables ( 0) included, the residual may still be correlated
with our regressor of interest, which could then cause our above estimated results to be
biased.
To further deal with this endogeneity concern, we adopt the instrumental variable
estimation approach. The rationale of our proposed instruments (all of which are prox-
ies for the level of government expropriation in region , denoted by ) is that  is
orthogonal to the unobserved firm characteristics (denoted by ). There are several
reasons why this assumption may be satisfied in our analysis. First, as the protection of
private properties was not written into the Constitution until March 2004, there was no
formal channel during our sample year (i.e., 1999) for private entrepreneurs to constrain
regional government expropriation. Second, as very few private entrepreneurs were mem-
bers of the Chinese People’s Congress (i.e., 34 out of 2,798 in our sample), it was diﬃcult
for individual entrepreneurs to use this highest organ of legislative power in China to
17Note that here firm size is measured by the logarithm of employment. But our results are qualitatively
equivalent when firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets.
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constrain regional government expropriation. Third, as the unobserved firm characteris-
tics  is the residue after controlling for a long list of variables, including particularly
entrepreneurial human capital, political capital and social capital, it is hardly possible
for this unobserved firm characteristics to constrain regional government expropriation.
One may still argue that entrepreneurs have some unobserved characteristics that could
be used to constrain regional government expropriation. However, for such individual
characteristics to have any influence, it requires the collective action by all those entre-
preneurs with similar unobserved characteristics, which is unlikely given that our sample
firms are randomly chosen and that private enterprises only constitute a small share of
the enterprises in each region.
Specifically, we use three alternative proxies of  as the instrumental variables, that
is, the average assessment of the severity of government expropriation by other surveyed
firms in the same region, an index of property rights protection compiled by Fan, Wang,
and Zhu (2003), and a historical proxy of the level of regional government expropriation
— the distribution of domestic banks across China’s regions in 1937. For more detailed
discussion on the relevance of these instruments, see Lu, Png, and Tao (2013), and
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002).
The regression results using these instrumental variables are reported in Table 4. The
relevance condition of the instrumental variables is confirmed by the highly significant
correlation between the instrumental variable and the endogenous variable (Government
Expropriation), and the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic (Panel B
of Table 4). Meanwhile, the concern for weak instrument is ruled out by the result of the
Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Panel B of Table 4).18 Panel A of Table 4 shows that Govern-
ment Expropriation, being instrumented, still has a positive and statistically significant
impact on firm diversification.19
Admittedly, all of these three instruments have their strengths and weaknesses. How-
ever, the consistent and robust findings obtained using these instrumental variables lend
strong support to the eﬀect of government expropriation on firm diversification.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We first investigate whether our main results are robust to an alternative measure of
firm diversification, Number of Industries, which takes value zero, one, two and three
if the firm has investment in one, two, three and four industries, respectively. The
18The Cragg-Donald F-statistic values for our regressions are significantly above the value of 10, which
is considered as the critical value by Staiger and Stock (1997).
19Note that the instrumental variable estimates are much larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
The increase in the magnitude suggests the existence of unobservables  that is correlated with
government expropriation and firm diversification in diﬀerent directions. Another possibility is the noisy
measurement of a firm’s perception of government expropriation, which could then bias the OLS estimates
downward to zero.
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instrumental variable estimation results are reported in Column 1 (including Panels A
and B) of Table 5, where Number of Industries is instrumented by the Fan-Wang-Zhu
index. It is found that government expropriation still has a positive and statistically
significant causal impact on firm diversification. The OLS results shown in Panel C of
Table 5 are similar.
In Column 2, we include Entertainment Fee in the construction of our measure of gov-
ernment expropriation. Despite a significant drop in sample size, we still find a significant
eﬀect of government expropriation on firm diversification, with its magnitude becoming
even larger.
Some of China’s private enterprises were transformed from state-owned enterprises as
a result of privatization. State-owned enterprises are known for pursuing diversification
because of agency costs consideration. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises might also
have been encouraged by the governments to merge to form conglomerates or enterprise
groups. Thus a potential concern is that the degree of firm diversification could be due
to the legacies of pre-privatization practices. To alleviate this concern, we restrict our
sample to those firms that started from scratch as private enterprises, and repeat the
analysis. As summarized in Column 3 of Table 5, our main results are robust to this
subsample.
As some firms may have businesses across various regions, their decisions on diversi-
fication should be aﬀected by the severity of government expropriation in those various
regions. However, our measure of government expropriation is based on entrepreneurial
perception of the regions where their headquarters are located. Consequently, our results
regarding the impacts of government expropriation on firm diversification could be biased
if firms have substantial businesses outside of their headquarters’ regions. To address this
concern, we restrict our sample to those firms with the majority of businesses conducted
in the same regions where their headquarters are located.20 As reported in Column 4 of
Table 5, our main results remain robust within this subsample.
4 Discussion: Chinese-Style Diversification under State
Capitalism
The Chinese economy is widely regarded as following a model of state capitalism where
the state controls the economy through widespread state ownership and adopts discrimi-
natory policies against private ownership in the form of extensive and opaque government
regulations. Compared with their counterparts in developed economies with good trans-
parency, level-playing fields and appropriate levels of regulations, private entrepreneurs
20In the Survey, there is a question asking the firm the percentage of sales within the region where its
headquarters is located. If the percentage exceeds 50%, the firm is classified as one with the majority of
its businesses conducted in the same region where its headquarters is located.
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under China’s state capitalism typically bear extra costs of doing business in order to go
through administrative procedures.
Firstly, private entrepreneurs in China have to incur a substantial amount of one-time
overhead, setup costs, which are on top of the fixed costs associated with starting any
specific line of business. These setup costs mainly consist of two parts. The first one is the
excessive time and monetary costs entrepreneurs have to bear in going through govern-
ment red tape, i.e., complicated and characteristically opaque business entry regulations.
The second part is the costs to seek and establish connections with bureaucrats who
have sweeping powers of approving business entry applications and issuing business li-
censes. Since the administration of entry regulations depends on the subjective and often
arbitrary interpretation by relevant government oﬃcials, private entrepreneurs have to
spend much time to first get acquainted with those government oﬃcials, and then please
them. To this end, private entrepreneurs may need to support some “image projects” or
signature projects that are launched not so much for the interests of people but mainly
to show oﬀ the “correct leadership” or administrative performance of oﬃcials in charge.
Furthermore, private entrepreneurs may need to nurture close relationships with bureau-
crats and/or their family members through gifts and favors, who have powers to allocate
government contracts, distribute loans from state banks, etc. Only after paying for these
explicit and implicit costs are private entrepreneurs able to obtain approval or licenses
for establishing business. In other words, private entrepreneurs have to bear large setup
costs to satisfy numerous regulatory requirements and curry favor with oﬃcials to acquire
the rights to do business.
Because government expropriation of private properties (including outright corruption
of government oﬃcials) is illegal on paper (or by the disciplines of China’s Communist
Party), although much of the expropriation could be disguised under diﬀerent names
and causes, each bureaucrat is typically cautious and establishes close relationships with
only a small number of selected business people whom she/he trusts. The small set of
trusted business people, in turn, develop relationships specific to the relevant bureaucrat,
and are able to go through regulations to get their businesses started and operated in
an environment that is discriminatory against private enterprises. The specificity of the
relationship as well as the ease or privileges of doing business implies that at a given
point of time, the rights to do business are specific to the region or industry that the
bureaucrat is in charge of and thus are not transferable to other regions or industries.
Over time when the bureaucrat moves across regions and/or industries, the rights to do
business might extend or shift to other regions and/or industries where the bureaucrat
administers.
Secondly, after setting up their businesses, private entrepreneurs need to continue
to please bureaucrats to maintain their rights to do business. They need to continue
to provide financial assistance to bureaucrats to help relieve regional fiscal burden and
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support signature projects launched by the bureaucrats. Typically, private enterprises
are imposed with informal levies and extralegal payments, often handed down to firms
in the name of fulfilling corporate social responsibility such as upholding labor rights,
maintaining environmental quality, contributing to local public projects or public goods
provisions, etc. Moreover, private entrepreneurs need to keep giving gifts and favors to
bureaucrats and/or their family members to maintain close connections and keep their
business operation smooth. All these ongoing levies and the time and monetary costs
needed for keeping the relations with bureaucrats are the extra variable costs, again on
top of the usual variable costs associated with any specific line of business.
This kind of interaction between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs points to the inter-
section of money and power under China’s state capitalism, which is expected to shape
the Chinese-style firm diversification across industries. Firstly, the identity of profitable
industries changes with the new developments in the economy over time. By maintaining
the relationship-specific rights to do business, private entrepreneurs can have privileges in
obtaining business licenses and entering new profitable industries upon their emergence.
Secondly, with massive state control of the economy, the Chinese governments at various
levels often launch large-scale government-sponsored projects backed by fiscal revenues,
which would involve numerous government procurement plans. The relationship-specific
rights to do business would enable private entrepreneurs to be treated favorably in bid-
ding for government procurement contracts. As these government projects typically cover
various socioeconomic aspects and the industry identity of the projects changes from time
to time, the winning private entrepreneurs might need to expand into new industries from
time to time after obtaining government contracts.
The Chinese economy is characterized with substantial disparity in the quality of
economic institutions across regions. In regions with slower progress in market economy
development and weaker legal institutions, the bureaucrats face fewer constraints in ex-
propriating private properties. In other words, in those regions, entrepreneurs have to
incur a larger amount of irregular levies, extralegal payment and bribes to build trust and
maintain their relations with the bureaucrats. The flip side is that in those regions with
such high extra costs of doing business (i.e., both the setup costs and the ongoing costs for
building and maintaining relations with the bureaucrats, on top of the usual fixed costs
and variable costs for doing business) the bureaucrats typically have more discretionary
power to grant favorable treatments (e.g., government procurement contracts) to these
entrepreneurs, which allows entrepreneurs to enter new business lines. Thus, it is not
surprising that firms often display a higher degree of industry diversification under more
severe government expropriation.
It is noteworthy that the relationship-specific rights to do business are likely to enable
private entrepreneurs to expand the size of their existing business lines instead of diversi-
fication into new ones. Nevertheless, the following considerations suggest that industrial
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diversification within a region may well be a more viable strategy. (1) The market size
of the region is relatively small. To reach the optimal scale of production, firms may
need to supply their products to other regions to expand their existing business line (i.e.,
geographical diversification).21 (2) Given that the rights to do business are typically
region-specific, however, setting up businesses in other regions will incur new one-time
setup costs and ongoing levies imposed by other regional governments. Moreover, the ex-
istence of local protectionism deters interregional trade (Bai, Du, Tao, and Tong, 2004),
putting further constraints on the viability of expanding the existing business lines across
regions. (3) Regardless of whether the rights to do business are specific to a region or an
industry, the fast-changing economic landscape dictates the rapid shift in the pattern of
comparative profitability of diﬀerent industries or business lines. Private entrepreneurs
may well ride on their relationship-specific capital to enter the newly emerging profitable
industries or businesses. (4) The government-administered projects are typically gener-
ated by the changing and varied demands in socioeconomic development, for which the
expansion of existing business lines can hardly accommodate.
Two recently exposed high-profile cases in China might vividly illustrate the Chinese-
style diversification of private entrepreneurs. The first case is about how Mr. Xu Ming, a
business tycoon, rose and fell with Mr. Bo Xilai, once one of the most powerful bureau-
crats in China.22
When Mr. Bo became the mayor of Dalian, a major port city in northeastern China,
in 1993, Mr. Xu had just founded a small business exporting shrimp and doing landfill
work. Through the help of a Taiwanese-American businessman, Mr. Xu got to know Mr.
Bo and his wife, Ms. Gu Kailai. At the time, to showcase his talent and administrative
achievements, Mr. Bo launched a campaign to build the city into a shipping, fashion and
information-technology hub and an international garden city with massive infrastructure
developments. Mr. Xu, along with several other entrepreneurs, made financial contribu-
tions to Mr. Bo’s ambitious plan to promote the city’s image. As a reward for his support
for Mr. Bo’s campaign, the Dalian Shide, the company controlled by Mr. Xu, won landfill
contracts for more than 30 large government construction projects. In order to beautify
the buildings in the city, Mr. Bo was interested in introducing PVC products. Mr. Xu
decided to take substantial business risks to start the manufacturing of PVC products.
In 1995, Dalian Shide and a German company established a joint venture to make PVC
door and window frames. Mr. Bo was pleased and ordered that many buildings in Dalian
install PVC windows and doors with government subsidy provided to hasten installation.
21China’s private enterprises could export their products to international markets so as to achieve the
optimal scale of production. However, in 2000 (the year when the Survey was conducted), which was
prior to China’s entry to the World Trade Organization, those private enterprises had to export through
state-owned trading companies, as a result of which their share in China’s export was rather low.
22This case is based on “A Tycoon Rises and Falls With a Chinese Leader” (The Wall Street Journal,
June 22, 2012) and other related news reports.
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The joint venture benefited tremendously from this government initiative. In addition,
to help Mr. Bo realize his political ambitions, Mr. Xu purchased a landmark balloon for
Dalian, which satisfied Mr. Bo and Ms. Gu’s wish to promote the image of the city. Mr.
Xu also acquired and further invested in Dalian’s soccer team, the best one in China at
that time, which Mr. Bo took an interest as a way to enhance the city’s profile.
In maintaining close relations with Mr. Bo and his family, Mr. Xu also provided
numerous personal favors and gifts. For example, Mr. Xu accompanied and financed Ms.
Gu and her son in their trips to Britain for school hunting and covered her son’s tuition.
Mr. Xu bought a luxurious villa in Cannes, France for Mr. Bo’s family.
Over the eight years (1993-2001) when Mr. Bo was the leader of Dalian, Mr. Xu
made considerable investments into maintaining his relationships with Mr. Bo and his
family, and reaped huge benefits from his relationship-specific rights to do business. His
company grew into a major national conglomerate whose business covered plastics, finance
and property, largely thanks to local government policies and government contracts linked
to Mr. Bo’s ambitious campaign.
Mr. Xu’s relationship-specific rights to do business was also extended across regions
and industries over time. In 2004, Mr. Bo moved to Beijing to serve as China’s commerce
minister in charge of issuing import and export licenses. Mr. Xu’s Dalian Shide became
one of a handful private companies that were granted licenses to import crude and refined
oil. In 2007, Mr. Bo became the Party chief of Chongqing. By 2009, Dalian Shide
executives set up a property development company in Chongqing to ride on the property
market boom.
The second case is concerned with Ms. Ding Shumiao, a businesswoman from Shanxi
province, and Mr. Liu Zhijun, the disgraced former railway minister.23 In the late 1990s,
Ms. Ding got acquainted with Mr. Liu when he was the vice railway minister and won his
trust. It is alleged that Mr. Liu regarded Ms. Ding as trustworthy and took a long-term
strategy, i.e., he helped Ms. Ding establish and expand her business but did not ask for
favors immediately and regularly. Only when he direly needed financial assistance did
Mr. Liu ask Ms. Ding to help. To cultivate Ms. Ding as an entrepreneur, Mr. Liu himself
and through his associates helped Ms. Ding acquire railway freight quota, with which
Ms. Ding gained tremendous wealth from conducting coal transportation by herself and
reselling quota to others. It is reported that Ms. Ding gained a profit of 440 million yuan
from using or reselling railway freight quota in coal transportation in the period 2004-10
only.
In 2003, Mr. Liu became the railway minister. He started to launch his ambitious
campaign for leap-frog development in railway construction and train speedup. He first
carried out the campaign to raise the speed of trains, and then started up the massive
23This case is written on the basis of “Ding Shumiao, tycoon linked to ex-rail chief, stands trial” (South
China Morning Post, September 25, 2013) and other related news reports.
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investment and construction scheme of the high-speed railway lines. In view of the new
business opportunities arising from these campaigns, Ms. Ding founded Beijing Boyou
Investment Company. It formed a joint venture with an Italian company to produce
railway equipment first. With the expansion of Mr. Liu’s high-speed railway project, Ms.
Ding’s company quickly expanded to the production of high-speed railway equipment and
railway construction. Later, her company even entered business areas of advertisement
and media, movies and TV plays, hotel, etc. Mr. Liu helped Ms. Ding and her families
or associates win railway construction projects and gain profits of nearly 400 million
yuan. In addition, Mr. Liu helped Ms. Ding to serve as middleman to win bids for high-
speed railway projects for various enterprises, from which Ms. Ding obtained tremendous
amounts of middleman commission fees (240 million yuan).
Ms. Ding returned the favor by providing financial assistance to Mr. Liu when he
badly needed it. Ms. Ding spent 5 million yuan to help Mr. Liu lobby Party chieftains
for the position of a provincial Party chief, which is generally considered as a stepping
stone for even higher positions in the Party and the government. When one of Mr. Liu’s
subordinates was charged with corruption, Ms. Ding spent 44 million yuan in attempt
to reduce his penalty in order to prevent him from revealing Mr. Liu’s misdeeds. It is
also alleged that Ms. Ding introduced quite a few actresses in her movie business to be
Mr. Liu’s mistresses.
These two cases show clearly that the Chinese-style diversification is often driven by
the relationship-specific rights to do business. Firm diversification often relies on the
business opportunities over which the bureaucrat has control. Hence, in the period when
the bureaucrat remains in one region or one industry, the rights to do business are also
region-specific or industry-specific. When the bureaucrat moves from one region or one
industry to another, the region-specificity or industry-specificity also changes accordingly.
Moreover, the industries that private entrepreneurs expand into are often the ones re-
lated to the bureaucrat’s development plan and/or what the administrative power of the
bureaucrat covers. Interestingly, the Chinese-style diversification is expected to generate
considerable rents for entrepreneurs, which in turn enable entrepreneurs to pay for the
maintenance of the relationship-specific rights to do business.
The Chinese-style diversification has important social welfare implications. Firstly,
as mentioned above, given that the rights of doing business is often location specific,
expanding an existing line of business geographically may not be a viable strategy even
for the most eﬃcient and most qualified private entrepreneurs. This is because they would
have to face the one-time setup costs and ongoing levies of other regional governments
if they were to expand the existing line of business geographically. This deters private
firms from achieving economy of scale, and thus leads to eﬃciency losses. Secondly,
the fact that firm diversification is typically driven by relationship-specific rights to do
business means the firms obtaining licenses and entering some industries are often not
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the most eﬃcient and most qualified producers, which will undermine product quality,
retard productivity growth and harm economic eﬃciency improvement. Thirdly, the firms
obtaining government contracts are in many cases serving as middlemen and outsourcing
the projects to other producers. On the one hand, this will squeeze the profits of actual
producers to create rents for the middlemen, which may prompt actual producers to lower
product quality in order to win normal profits. On the other hand, to accommodate
middleman commission, the government projects might oﬀer a price much higher than
the market price, which will lead to misuse of public funds.24
5 Conclusion
Diversified firms have been found to be very popular in many emerging economies. This
is in contrast to the practices in developed economies, and it is also against the research
findings using data of publicly listed firms that diversification has a negative impact on
firm performance. While it has been argued that diversified firms may thrive in situations
of poor economic institutions, much research is needed to substantiate this argument.
In this paper, we fill the gap by empirically investigating the impacts of government
expropriation on firm diversification. Using a survey data set of private enterprises in
China, we find that government expropriation has a positive impact on firm diversifi-
cation. In order to conclude that our finding is not biased due to omitted variables
and reverse causality, we conduct an instrumental variable estimation using three al-
ternative instruments and a series of robustness checks. To understand how in China
government expropriation leads to diversification of private enterprises, we also present
two case studies to highlight the extra costs that China’s private entrepreneurs need to
bear for doing businesses. Our discussion demonstrates that the Chinese-style firm di-
versification is closely associated with China’s state capitalism. Treated discriminatively
as adopted kids, private entrepreneurs make eﬀorts to win trust from bureaucrats and
gain relationship-specific rights to do business, and then leverage their privileges into new
business lines often following government bureaucrats’ new development initiatives and
signature projects.
Our study highlights the fundamental importance of economic institutions, particu-
larly, property rights protection (i.e., the institutions constraining government expropria-
tion of private properties), for corporate decisions. It also sheds light on the institutional
foundations for the divergent patterns of firm diversification between emerging economies
and developed economies. We show that firm diversification in China often involves over-
diversification induced by government discrimination and expropriation under China’s
state capitalism model. Once the institutional environment for China’s private sector
24For example, there are reports that the procurement costs of chairs in high-speed trains are much
higher than the market price (see, e.g., Wang, Yu, and Wang, 2013).
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improves, we expect private enterprises to exhibit less industrial diversification, more ge-
ographical diversification, and be more eﬃcient and competitive, and ultimately account
for a greater share in China’s overall economy.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Diversification 2798 0.334 0.472 0.000 1.000 
Number of Industries 2798 0.447 0.733 0.000 3.000 
Government Expropriation 2033 0.000 1.296 -1.509 2.608 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics      
Human Capital      
Education 2793 12.601 2.854 0.000 19.000 
Age 2777 43.429 8.347 22.000 75.000 
Managerial Experience 2795 4.279 7.272 0.000 61.000 
SOE Cadre 2798 0.364 0.481 0.000 1.000 
Political Capital      
CPC Membership 2798 0.158 0.365 0.000 1.000 
CPPCC Membership 2798 0.407 0.491 0.000 1.000 
Government Cadre 2798 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Social Capital      
Donation 2590 0.929 0.258 0.000 1.000 
Social Status 2728 6.672 1.958 1.000 10.000 
Firm Characteristics      
Firm Age 2535 1.652 0.714 0.000 3.045 
Firm Size 2653 4.073 1.344 0.000 9.903 
Contracting Institutions 2793 0.398 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Financing Institution 2792 0.602 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Taxation Policy 2792 0.532 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Equal Treatment 2792 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Table 2, Comparison of Diversified Firms Group and Focused Firms Group 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Diversification=0 Diversification=1 t-statistic Diversification=0 Diversification=1 
Wilcoxon 
z-statistic 
  Mean Mean Mean(1)-Mean(2) Median Median Median(4)-Median(5) 
Government Expropriation -0.090 0.173 -4.35*** -0.457 0.550 -4.72*** 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics       
Human Capital       
Education 12.265 13.271 -8.91*** 12 12 -9.08*** 
Age 43.836 42.617 3.64*** 44 42 3.66*** 
Managerial Experience  4.053 4.730 -2.32** 0 0 -3.81*** 
SOE Cadre 0.337 0.419 -4.25*** 0 0 -4.24*** 
Political Capital       
Government Cadre 0.060 0.105 -4.26*** 0 0 -4.24*** 
CPC Membership 0.149 0.177 -1.88* 0 0 -1.88* 
CPPCC Membership 0.369 0.484 -5.86*** 0 0 -5.83*** 
Social Capital       
Donation 0.912 0.962 -4.70*** 1 1 -4.68*** 
Social Status 6.516 6.986 -5.94*** 6 7 -6.38*** 
Firm Characteristics        
Firm Age 2.201 2.288 -3.21*** 2.398 2.398 -2.62*** 
Firm Size 3.869 4.478 -11.27*** 3.829 4.407 -10.38*** 
Contracting Institutions 0.388 0.419 -1.57 0 0 -1.57 
Financing Institution 0.560 0.685 -6.44*** 1 1 -6.39*** 
Taxation Policy 0.520 0.556 -1.80* 1 1 -1.80* 
Equal Treatment 0.349 0.476 -6.54*** 0 0 -6.49*** 
Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 3: Benchmark Regression Results 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: OLS Estimation Dependent Variable is Diversification 
Government Expropriation 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.020** 0.018** 0.014* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics        
Human Capital        
Education  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age  -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Managerial Experience   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
SOE Cadre  0.072*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.037 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Political Capital        
Government Cadre   0.115*** 0.121*** 0.137*** 0.101** 0.081* 
    (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
CPC Membership   0.037 0.020 -0.015 -0.021 -0.021 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
CPPCC Membership   0.089*** 0.061*** 0.017 0.002 -0.010 
    (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Social Capital        
Donation    0.136*** 0.091*** 0.077** 0.057 
    (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) 
Social Status    0.029*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Characteristics         
Firm Age     0.045*** 0.041** 0.031* 
      (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size     0.041*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Contracting Institutions     -0.028 -0.027 -0.018 
     (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Financing Institution     0.083*** 0.086*** 0.079*** 
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Taxation Policy     -0.017 -0.005 -0.005 
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Equal Treatment     0.060*** 0.056*** 0.033 
     (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Industrial Characteristics        
Industry Dummies      Yes Yes 
Regional Characteristics        
Region Dummies      No Yes 
Number of Observations 2,033 2,018 2,018 1,887 1,822 1,822 1,822 
R-squared 0.0092 0.0498 0.0624 0.0819 0.1119 0.1572 0.2088 
F-test 19.15 20.63 16.96 18.61 18.05 16.41 - 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
Panel B: Probit Estimation Dependent Variable is Diversification 
Government Expropriation 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.021** 0.017* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Note: White-robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Constant term is included in all regression but results are not reported to save space. Panel B reports the marginal effect of 
Probit estimation. 
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
 
 
  1 2 3 
Panel A: Second Stage of the 2SLS Dependent Variable is Diversification 
Government Expropriation 0.101** 0.249** 0.116* 
  (0.041) (0.101) (0.067) 
Controls    
Human Capital X X X 
Political Capital X X X 
Social Capital X X X 
Firm Characteristics  X X X 
Industrial Characteristics X X X 
Regional Characteristics X X X 
Panel B: First Stage of the 2SLS Dependent Variable is Government Expropriation 
Regional Average Assessment of Government Expropriation 0.799***   
 (0.090)   
Fan-Wang-Zhu Index  -0.121***  
  (0.028)  
Logarithm of Banks in 1937   -0.152*** 
   (0.028) 
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic [62.60]*** [18.26]*** [27.29]*** 
Cragg-Donald F statistic [78.53] [18.33] [27.89] 
Number of Observations 1,822 1,822 1,810 
Note: White-robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Constant term is included in all regression but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space. In all regressions, the first stage of 2SLS includes the 
same control variables as those in the second stage but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space. 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Sample Whole Sample Whole Sample Subsample 1 Subsample 2 
Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable is Number of 
Industries 
Dependent Variable is Diversification 
Government Expropriation 0.570*** 0.288*** 0.248** 0.308** 
  (0.104) (0.123) (0.121) (0.147) 
Controls     
Human Capital X X X X 
Political Capital X X X X 
Social Capital X X X X 
Firm Characteristics  X X X X 
Industrial Characteristics X X X X 
Regional Characteristics X X X X 
Panel B: First Stage of 2SLS  Dependent Variable is Government Expropriation 
Fan-Wang-Zhu Index -0.049*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) 
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic [11.97]*** [13.66]*** [13.82]*** [10.15]*** 
Cragg-Donald F statistic [12.03] [13.61] [13.96] [10.13] 
Panel C: OLS   
Government Expropriation 0.549*** 0.024** 0.011 0.021** 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of Observations 2,395 1,208 1,252 1,207 
Note: White-robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Constant term is included in all regression but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space. In all 
regressions, the first stage of 2SLS includes the same control variables as those in the second stage but the estimated coefficients are 
not reported to save space. 
 
